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1 
Feminist Metaphysics:  
Can This Marriage be Saved? 
Jennifer McKitrick 
1 Introduction 
Feminist metaphysics is simultaneously feminist theorizing and meta-
physics. Part of feminist metaphysics concerns social ontology and 
considers such questions as, What is the nature of social kinds, such 
as genders? Feminist metaphysicians also consider whether gendered 
perspectives influence metaphysical theorizing; for example, have ap-
proaches to the nature of the self or free will been conducted from a 
masculinist perspective, and would a feminist perspective yield dif-
ferent theories? Some feminist metaphysicians develop metaphysi-
cal theories with the aim of furthering certain social goals, such as 
gender equality. 
Despite these and other intriguing research projects, feminist meta-
physics faces challenges from two flanks: one might argue that “femi-
nist metaphysics” is not metaphysics, or one might argue that it is not 
feminist. Recently, Elizabeth Barnes (2014) has made the case that, 
since contemporary accounts of the nature of metaphysics focus pri-
marily on the fundamental, they have the problematic implication that 
feminist metaphysics is not, properly speaking, metaphysics. However, 
less emphasis has been paid, of late, to the idea that major strands of 
feminist thought also problematize feminist metaphysics. I will briefly 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
Published in The Bloomsbury Companion to Academic Feminism, Pieranna Garavaso, editor 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), pp 58-79. 
Copyright © 2018 Pieranna Garavaso.    
J .  M c K i t r i c k  i n  B l o o m s b u ry  C o m pa n i o n  t o  A c a d e m i c  F e m i n i s m  ( 2 0 1 8 )       2
assess the metaphysician’s case against feminist metaphysics in Sec-
tion 2 of this chapter. Then, in Section 3, I will examine in more detail 
possible feminist concerns over metaphysics. In Section 4, I sketch a 
different conception of metaphysics that avoids both mainstream and 
feminist challenges to feminist metaphysics.  
2 Metaphysicians against feminist metaphysics 
Metaphysics that ignores feminist concerns is often called “traditional” 
or “mainstream” metaphysics-a label which already suggests that, 
even if feminist metaphysics is possible, it flouts philosophical tradi-
tions and is outside of the mainstream. I do not agree, but I’ll use these 
terms to mark the contrast. Let me start with the charge that what-
ever feminist philosophers are doing it cannot be metaphysics. I know 
of no mainstream metaphysician who explicitly makes this claim, but 
arguably it follows from what many take metaphysics to be.1 One could 
argue that mainstream metaphysics has a number of features which 
make it incompatible with feminist theory: mind-independence, a fo-
cus on fundamentality, realism, and value neutrality. In the next sub-
section, I elaborate these features and explore their implications for 
feminist metaphysics. 
2.1 Characteristics of “mainstream” metaphysics 
a. Mind-independence 
First, the subject matter of metaphysics is said to be mind-inde-
pendent reality. Agents with minds, and everything that depends, 
for its existence, on agents with minds, are not part of mind-inde-
pendent reality. Social kinds are, by definition, constituted or con-
structed by communities of entities with minds. Consequently, any 
investigation into the nature of social kinds would not be a meta-
physical project, nor would any attempt to give a social construc-
tivist account of any phenomenon. 
1. Barnes argues mainstream characterizations of metaphysics, such as those of Theodore 
Sider and Jonathan Schaffer, rule out feminist metaphysics. However, both Sider and Schaf-
fer argue that their views are amenable to feminist metaphysics. See Sider (2016) and 
Schaffer (2016). 
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b. Focus on fundamentality 
Second, as Barnes stresses in her 2014 article “Going Beyond the 
Fundamental: Feminism in Contemporary Metaphysics,” the sub-
ject matter of metaphysics is said to be fundamental reality-things 
like indivisible simple particulars and their perfectly natural prop-
erties. Complex entities such as people and social groups, and their 
features such as genders and social structures, again, are just out-
side of this domain. 
c. Realism 
Third, much of mainstream metaphysics, in the analytical tradition 
at any rate, is regarded as a realist endeavor by its practitioners, in 
that it aspires to provide a true description of reality. Furthermore, 
this commitment to realism is often coupled with a particular un-
derstanding of what realism entails, which connects with the first 
two features of mainstream metaphysics. What is real is thought to 
be mind-independent, that is, not the result of any sort of fiction, 
pretense, or convention. Some go further and argue that only the 
fundamental is real, and consequently, realist metaphysics exclu-
sively concerns the fundamental (Fine 2002; Heil2012). By these 
lights, feminist metaphysics is anti-realist and not, properly speak-
ing, metaphysics. 
d. Value neutrality 
Fourth, metaphysics is supposed to be a value-neutral, apolitical 
endeavor. Consequently, when considering legitimate reasons for 
or against any particular metaphysical theory, one’s social stand-
ing or political perspective is deemed to be irrelevant. For in-
stance, whether one is a masculinist or a feminist has no bearing 
on whether objects are bundles of properties, or whether they have 
substrata. 
Value neutrality, together with mind-independence and realism, en-
tails that metaphysics aspires to be objective, both in its methods and 
its results. Arguably, a feminist perspective compromises this objec-
tivity, as would any political perspective. And insofar as feminist the-
orists aim to advance certain social goals, they abandon the objectiv-
ity that is the hallmark of realist metaphysics. Consequently, whatever 
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feminist philosophers are doing, it is not metaphysics, it is not rele-
vant to metaphysics, and so there can be no feminist metaphysics. Or 
so one might argue. 
2.2 The narrowness of the “mainstream” conception 
The characterization of mainstream metaphysics given above can 
be rejected as too narrow, for reasons independent of feminist con-
cerns. Clearly, it leaves more than feminist issues out of the domain 
of metaphysics. Consider the philosophy of color-red, green, blue, and 
so forth. Many theorists about color hold that color properties are 
not perfectly natural, fundamental mind-independent properties, but, 
rather that the identities of color properties depend on the natures of 
the visual systems of perceiving agents (Byrne and Hilbert 2003). Fur-
thermore, some argue that color discrimination capacities, and conse-
quently color itself, vary across populations and are culturally relative 
(Roberson et al. 2005). These ideas concern not just our knowledge 
about colors, but what colors essentially are-an apparently metaphys-
ical issue. However, it follows from the characterization of metaphys-
ics given above that an investigation into the nature of color proper-
ties is not a metaphysical project. In fact, John Heil argues that color 
predicates do not denote properties, and consequently color proper-
ties are absent from “serious ontology” (2012: 153). 
But arguably, he is the one who is out of step with traditional 
metaphysics, since the nature of color has been discussed under the 
rubric of metaphysics for centuries, and continues to be so (Jack-
son 1929; Guerlac 1986; Puryear 2013). Colors are a paradigm case 
of the so-called secondary qualities, whose ontological status and 
connection to primary qualities has been debated since at least the 
Early Modern era. Lawrence Nolan, author of Primary and Second-
ary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate, writes: “nature of 
color is presently one of the most contentious topics in metaphys-
ics” (2011: 2; my emphasis). And philosophy of color is just one ex-
ample. Free will, personal identity, and the relation between mind 
and body have traditionally been considered metaphysical topics. Re-
stricting the subject matter of metaphysics to fundamental ontology 
would rule out these topics as well, since discussion of these top-
ics necessarily involves entities with minds, which are presumably 
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non-fundamental. So, if such mainstream challenges purport to dis-
tinguish “traditional” metaphysics from feminist theory, they begin 
by redefining the tradition. 
2.3 Terminological or substantive? 
Another response to the traditionalist challenge to feminist meta-
physics is to claim that it is mere terminological quibbling. One may 
wonder, what’s in a name? What hangs on a subdiscipline being 
called “metaphysics”? Perhaps, if you want, you could draw a dis-
tinction between metaphysics about the fundamental stuff on the one 
hand and applied metaphysics on the other. So it seems that some 
of the traditionalist considerations against feminist metaphysics are 
more relevant to what it’s called, rather than its status as a worth-
while endeavor. 
However, other traditionalist considerations against feminist meta-
physics go deeper. Recall that, from a traditionalist point of view, 
when metaphysics is done correctly, it is objective, and political and 
social values are deemed irrelevant. Consequently, evaluating tradi-
tional metaphysics from a feminist perspective would be considered 
off base, and developing metaphysical theories from a feminist per-
spective would be problematic. So, a traditionalist may argue, whether 
or not we call the endeavor metaphysics, the methodology is suspect, 
and so are its conclusions. (I will address this charge in Section 4.) 
Recently, Theodore Sider defended his conception of substantive 
metaphysics from the complaint that it renders feminist metaphys-
ics non-substantive. He clarifies that being about the fundamental 
is sufficient for being a substantive metaphysical issue, but it is not 
necessary. Furthermore, he notes an ambiguity in the claim that sub-
stantive metaphysics is mind-independent. It could mean that mind-
dependent phenomena are not part of the subject matter of meta-
physics, or it could mean that the correct account of any phenomena 
should not depend on the minds of those considering it. Sider only en-
dorses the latter. He writes: “what is demanded is that the theorist’s 
point of view should not intrude into an objective description of real-
ity, not that facts about the dependence of phenomena on human ac-
tivity must be banned from the content of the description” (2016: 13, 
emphasis in original). 
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As applied to feminist metaphysics, Sider argues that it could be in-
dependent of human thought in the following sense: 
Although the subject matter of statements about gender and 
sex concerns human beings, there is no intrusion of the point 
of view of the human theorist on the judgment that sex is dis-
tinct from gender: that judgment is not a projection of the 
theorist’s politics or values or outlook, but rather is the ob-
jectively correct description of social reality. (2016: 5-6, em-
phasis in original) 
So, Sider’s metaphysics avoid two points of apparent conflict with 
feminist metaphysics-fundamentality and mind-independence. How-
ever, note that he steers headlong into a third-value neutrality. The 
idea that metaphysics can be done from a feminist point of view is 
apparently ruled out by Sider’s clarified characterization of what it 
means for metaphysics to be substantive. I will address this concern 
in Section 4, but first let’s consider some feminist reasons to be wary 
of feminist metaphysics. 
3 Feminists against feminist metaphysics 
Why would anyone think that “feminist metaphysics” isn’t feminist? 
Using the label “feminist theory” for feminist scholarship broadly con-
strued, the following question can be posed: does feminist theory in-
clude feminist metaphysics, or is the nature of metaphysics such that 
it has no place in feminist theory? Feminists may have various con-
cerns about feminist metaphysics. One concern is that the subject mat-
ter of metaphysics is so different from that of feminist theory that, 
insofar as a philosopher is doing metaphysics, she is contributing lit-
tle or nothing to feminist theory. Note that feminists with such con-
cerns can remain neutral about the merits of metaphysical inquiry per 
se, and would probably be more open to being convinced of the rele-
vance of metaphysics to feminism. A more serious feminist concern 
about feminist metaphysics stems from a general suspicion about any 
attempt to describe objective reality. Insofar as feminist metaphysi-
cians are attempting to describe objective reality, some feminists will 
regard their projects with suspicion. 
J .  M c K i t r i c k  i n  B l o o m s b u ry  C o m pa n i o n  t o  A c a d e m i c  F e m i n i s m  ( 2 0 1 8 )      7
A major source of tension between mainstream metaphysics and 
feminist theory is the feminists’ emphasis on social construction. As 
noted above, the mainstream metaphysician can argue that social 
constructivist accounts are not realist, or they have a different sub-
ject matter than metaphysics. However, some feminists also seem 
to think that the role that social construction plays in feminist the-
ory makes it incompatible with metaphysics. On the assumption that 
social construction is a pervasive phenomenon, any endeavor that 
aims to discover the nature of mind-independent reality is suspect. I 
disagree. Not only can metaphysics concern social realities, but also 
theorizing about asocial reality is not as problematic as some social 
constructivists suggest. 
3.1 What is not socially constructed? 
To investigate asocial reality is essentially to ask: What is not socially 
constructed? What is it like? To adequately address these questions, 
one must have some understanding of what it means for something 
to be socially constructed. There has been substantial work in femi-
nist metaphysics developing various accounts of what it means to say 
that something is socially constructed, what ontological categories so-
cially constructed things belong to, who or what does the construct-
ing, and how the construction is accomplished (Haslanger 1995; Asta 
2013; Diaz-Leon 2015). I’m not going to assume or advocate a partic-
ular account of social construction, but merely make what I take to 
be a modest assumption: If something is socially constructed, then 
some social entity is necessary for that thing to be what it is. So, so-
cially constructed things cannot predate societies. If the universe pre-
dates society, there was a time when nothing was socially constructed. 
The idea that some things, such as marriages, money, and univer-
sities are socially constructed is uncontroversial. It’s an interesting 
question how construction works even in these obvious cases (Searle 
1995). But where social constructivist accounts have the most im-
pact, I think, is where they show that something we thought was in-
dependent from social forces is, in fact, dependent upon and deter-
mined by them. The most interesting social constructivist claims are 
surprising-something that we thought was always and necessarily 
a certain way turns out to be a human invention of sorts. If there 
was a pre-social past, and social constructivist claims are correct, 
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none of the socially constructed things were there, no marriages or 
money, of course, but perhaps no men, women, males, females, or 
even people. What could such a world be like? What were things like 
before social construction? 
In addition to this very general question, theorists can also ask a 
number of related questions when considering what is not socially 
constructed. We need not restrict the inquiry to what things were 
like before any social construction whatsoever, but rather, before 
construction of some particular kind. For example, one could ask 
“what were things like before the construction of gender?” without 
supposing that nothing had been socially constructed previous to 
the construction of gender. Furthermore, questions about the past 
before social construction have analogues that are not historical or 
diachronic, but concern currently existing things. These questions 
include “What is given?,” “What is natural?,” “What are socially 
constructed things constructed out of?,” and “What nonsocial facts 
ground the social facts?” For example, suppose that some nonso-
cial biological fact grounds a certain social fact. Grounding is a syn-
chronic relation between facts that hold concurrently. So, while this 
biological fact would be “prior to” the social fact, in an ontological 
sense, it need not be temporally prior. 
For the most part, I am not distinguishing between the synchronic 
and diachronic senses in which something could be “prior to” social 
reality. More importantly, in this section, I am not trying to answer 
questions about what is not socially constructed. Rather, I want to as-
sess the prospects for answering them. In particular, I am interested 
in reasons for dismissing or resisting them. Is there something wrong 
with trying to answer such questions? Is there something wrong with 
theorizing about the unconstructed or asocial world? In what follows, 
I identify four feminist objections to theorizing about unconstructed 
reality. Metaphysicians should be cognizant of these worries. However, 
I will try to show that, while theorizing about what is prior to social 
construction presents various challenges, these challenges do not con-
stitute conclusive reasons to refrain from addressing such questions. 
But I begin with a brief exploration of the potentially positive role of 
theorizing about what is not socially constructed. 
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3.2 The role of counter-narratives 
The realization that something has been socially constructed should 
prompt us not only to question the idea that the status quo is un-
changeable, but also to revise the ways we think about the distant 
past and the natural world. If surprising social constructivist claims 
are correct, then we’ve been believing false origin stories. Without a 
counter-narrative, there’s a vacuum where those beliefs used to be, 
and things that seemed to have a satisfying causal explanation no lon-
ger have any. 
Questions about the natural world and the distant past are often 
addressed empirically. Some of the research in biology, archaeology, 
and anthropology tries to determine what things were like, indepen-
dent of social influences. Concerns about such research projects have 
been discussed by feminist philosophers of science, such as Sandra 
Harding (1986) and Alison Wylie (2002), as well as the biologist Anne 
Fausto-Sterling (1992). However, feminist scholars also offer alter-
native views about nature or the past, which are at least as well sup-
ported as rival explanations. For example, Fausto-Sterling argues that 
the idea that there are only two distinct biological sexes is socially 
constructed (1993: 20-24). To make her case, she shows that the bi-
ological evidence does not substantiate the male/female binary. She 
goes on to suggest that the biological data could equally support an 
alternative taxonomy according to which there are at least five sexes. 
Metaphysics can also playa role in exploring the possibilities that 
conflict with our current socially constructed reality. If I come to be-
lieve that a certain kind of entity depends on a certain kind of soci-
ety for its existence, I can try to conceptualize models of worlds that 
don’t include those kinds of entities. This would not only make possi-
ble a theory about the distant past, but could open up conceptual pos-
sibilities about the future. If theorizing about which is prior to, or in-
dependent of, social construction is possible, it could reveal untapped 
potentialities and strengthen the sense that things don’t have to be 
the way that they are. 
Traditionally, theorizing about how things might have been in the 
distant past, prior to the construction of our current social realities, 
has taken the form of hypotheses about the state of nature. Accord-
ing to some Early Modern Social Contractarians, in the state of nature, 
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the independent and self-sufficient noble savage roamed the wilder-
ness before deciding to better his life by cooperating with other peo-
ple. As Thomas Hobbes famously wrote, “Let us consider men ... as if 
... sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full 
maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other” (Hobbes 1651: 
Chapter VIII, section 1). This arguably has the consequence of justifying 
the status quo as that which has been agreed to by equal and autono-
mous individuals. But many of the assumptions of social contractarians 
have been challenged by feminists, such as the economist Julie Nelson, 
who writes, “Humans do not simply spring out of the earth. Humans 
are born of women, nurtured and cared for as dependent children and 
when aged or ill, socialized into family and community groups, and are 
perpetually dependent on nourishment and a home to sustain life .... 
the areas of life thought of as ‘women’s work’’’ (Nelson 1995: 135). Nel-
son rejects the Hobbesian origin story as empirically implausible, thus 
undermining its justificatory force. In its place, she envisions a more 
realistic state of nature that includes human beings at different stages 
of life with various dependencies and attachments. 
One can see a similar rejection and replacement strategy at work 
in Catherine MacKinnon’s paper “Difference and Dominance: On Sex 
Discrimination:’ MacKinnon writes that underlying what she calls 
“the difference approach” to sex discrimination law is a false story 
about the distant past, “Its underlying story is this: on the first day, 
difference was; on the second day, a division was created upon it; on 
the third day, irrational instances of dominance arose. Division may 
be rational or irrational. Dominance either seems or is justified. Dif-
ference is” (1987: 34). MacKinnon suggests that, according to this 
story, difference predated social construction. In the context, it is 
clear that the narrative MacKinnon is considering is one in which 
prehistoric males and females were naturally different in ways that 
provided a legitimate basis for distinguishing between them. This en-
abled one group, presumably the physically stronger males, to dom-
inate over the relatively weaker females. MacKinnon goes on to ar-
gue that this narrative has problematic political implications, and so 
she offers a counter-narrative: 
Here, on the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, 
probably by force. By the second day, division along the same 
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lines had to be relatively firmly in place. On the third day, if 
not sooner, differences were demarcated, together with so-
cial systems to exaggerate them in perception and in fact, 
because the systematically differential delivery of benefits 
and deprivations required making no mistake about who was 
who. (1987: 40, emphasis in original) 
To be clear, I do not think that MacKinnon intended this story to be 
any less political or any more objective than the one it replaces. But 
it is a description of possible circumstances prior to the construction 
of gender. 
So, feminists occasionally offer counter-narratives or theorize about 
what things are like, or were like, independent of the construction of 
our current social reality. Nevertheless, feminists also raise a number 
of objections to doing so.  
3.3 Feminist objections to theorizing about what is prior to 
social construction  
In feminist literature, one can discern suspicion of metaphysical proj-
ects which aim to describe things as they are objectively or indepen-
dently of social construction. I identify four lines of objection: that 
these projects lack relevance, that they are viciously circular, that they 
presuppose false dichotomies, and that they have a hidden agenda. 
a. Relevance 
Reconsider MacKinnon’s counter-narrative about difference and dom-
inance. Someone who is interested in developing a coherent theory 
about the distant past might ask the following questions about MacK-
innon’s story: What were things like before dominance? Doesn’t domi-
nation require a division between the dominators and the dominated? 
Was there anything different about those who achieved dominance? 
But MacKinnon isn’t interested in such questions. Were told that the 
day that dominance was achieved was “the first day that matters:’ It 
follows that whatever came before that day does not matter. So, while 
MacKinnon offers a hypothetical characterization of the distant past, 
she also suggests a limitation to this line of inquiry to “what matters:’ 
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Elsewhere, MacKinnon makes clear her impatience with philosoph-
ical debates that are deemed to be irrelevant. “Take the problem of 
‘is there a reality and how do I know I’m right about it?’ The ‘is there 
a there there?’ business. How do we deal in the face of Cartesian-
updated as existential-doubt? Women know the world is out there. 
Women know the world is out there because it hits us in the face. Lit-
erally” (1987: 59). 
A stalwart mainstream metaphysician might insist that sensory ex-
periences, no matter how painful, are not conclusive evidence about 
the nature of fundamental reality. But if the asocial, mind-indepen-
dent reality that metaphysicians are concerned about is necessarily 
outside of our conscious experience, then arguably it shouldn’t matter 
to feminists. If the goal of feminism is social change, arcane debates 
over the nature of fundamental reality seem irrelevant. What matters 
is our lived experiences, our social realities, and the levers of social 
change. Some feminist philosophers argue that, insofar as philosophy 
is feminist, it should advance feminist goals, and the futile quest for 
knowledge of objective truth about fundamental reality is irrelevant. 
Granted, metaphysics does little to advance some very important 
social goals. Furthermore, certain scholarly research projects have no 
reason to delve into  metaphysical questions. Take, for example, the 
ethnomethodological approach of Stoller, Garfinkel, and Rosen (1960). 
They ask us to bracket our “natural attitude” — the beliefs we unre-
flectively possess about a mind-independent external world. Instead 
of taking any position about the external world, they investigate what 
we do to make it real for ourselves. For example, they ask, how does 
an individual produce the reality of being a woman for others? Try-
ing to describe mind-independent reality just isn’t part of this proj-
ect.2 Similarly, in her essay “What Is a Woman?” Toril Moi does not 
reject the distinction between sex and gender according to which sex 
is biological while gender is social, but she argues that it is not rel-
evant to the account of embodied subjectivity that she wants to de-
velop (2001: 4). This charge of irrelevance suggests that the subject 
matter of metaphysics is too far removed from that of feminist the-
ory for feminist metaphysics to be possible. 
2. For discussion of Stoller and Garfinkel’s views, see Warnke (2010: 53). 
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b. Circularity 
A second reason against theorizing about what is outside of our so-
cially constructed reality is that doing so involves inescapable circu-
larity. Because we only have our socially constructed concepts to work 
with, it is impossible to grasp or describe anything other than that 
which is socially constructed. Any description we try to give of real-
ity will be put in terms of our language, organized according to our 
current categories. You can find this idea in Foucault’s History of Sex-
uality. On the prospects of an objective investigation into the nature 
of sexuality, he writes: 
One must not suppose that there exists a certain sphere 
of sexuality that would be the legitimate concern of a free 
and disinterested scientific inquiry were it not the object of 
mechanisms of prohibition brought to bear by the economic 
or ideological requirements of power. If sexuality was consti-
tuted as an area of investigation, this was only because rela-
tions of power had established it as a possible object. (Fou-
cault 1980: 98) 
As I interpret Foucault here, he is criticizing the view that we can 
investigate sexuality as it occurs naturally, free of the influence of ide-
ology. To suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is something-nat-
ural sexuality-that would exist and have a certain nature, in the ab-
sence of social forces. Foucault rejects this assumption. According to 
Foucault, if we think that we are investigating natural sexuality, we 
have, instead, imported our concept of sexuality into a context where 
it would not otherwise exist. Consequently, if we proceed as though 
there is something that answers to our concept to be investigated, 
what we learn about it tends to cohere with our preexisting notions. 
To put the circularity objection in more abstract terms, suppose 
that I was trying to understand the present Fs, and I endeavor to do 
so by researching the past Fs. I then marshal my evidence about the 
past Fs and offer an explanation of why the present Fs are the way 
that they are. According to the circularity objection, my interpreta-
tion of all evidence. relevant to the existence and nature of the past Fs 
is shaped by my “F” concept, and the arguments I give in support of 
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my claims about the nature of Fs are implicitly circular arguments. In 
short, when we try to think about what is not constructed, we think 
socially constructed thoughts. Insofar as metaphysics is about what 
is not socially constructed, it seems impossible. 
c. False dichotomies 
A third concern about trying to investigate what nonsocial things are 
like is that doing so presupposes a false distinction between what is 
social and what is natural. We find this view in Merleau-Ponty, who 
says “everything is both manufactured and natural in man” (1967: 
198), and Donna Haraway (2013), who argues that there is no clear 
boundary between what is natural and what is constructed. Similarly, 
in Sexing the Body, Fausto-Sterling argues against natural/social du-
alism, particularly with respect to sex and gender. She writes, “The 
more we look for a simple physical basis for ‘sex,’ the more it becomes 
clear that ‘sex’ is not a pure physical category. What bodily signals and 
functions we define as male or female come already entangled in our 
ideas about gender” (2000: 4). Insofar as the subject matter of meta-
physics is the natural, nonsocial world, the metaphysician assumes 
that we are capable of distinguishing the natural from the social. If 
this “false dichotomy” objection is correct, then we can make no such 
distinction, and metaphysics is impossible. 
d. Hidden agendas 
A fourth reason to resist addressing metaphysical questions about 
what is prior to social construction is that the answers are inevita-
bly self-serving; they mask ideology and socially constructed reality 
as given. The combination of masking social construction and asso-
ciating naturalness with inevitability, permanence, and normativity 
can be especially problematic. As Judith Butler writes, “Ontology is, 
thus, not a foundation, but a normative injunction that operates in-
sidiously by installing itself into political discourse as its necessary 
ground” (2011: 203). (I will discuss Butler’s suspicions about ontol-
ogy further in Section 4.) 
To illustrate the way political interests can shape inquiry, let’s sup-
pose that a certain social group is regarded as naturally suited for a 
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certain role. It then becomes easier to believe that they inevitably play 
that role, that they will always play that role, and that this is a good 
thing. Those that benefit from this social arrangement have every in-
centive to believe and perpetuate those ideas. In this case, pointing 
out what’s socially constructed is an act of resistance. 
But suppose that, after we discover that the group members’ suit-
ability for a certain role was socially constructed, we then ask “well, 
what social role are these people naturally suited for?” The question 
itself is rife with socially inculcated assumptions-that the expression 
“these people” refers to a homogeneous group, that the members of 
this group have similar capabilities, and that there is a reliable corre-
spondence between social roles and natural talents. But in addition, 
the answer to this question is just as fraught with the potential for 
contributing to oppression as the view that it would replace. It might 
be better not to try to answer or even ask that question. Likewise, if 
metaphysics is a Trojan horse which sneaks a political agenda into our 
worldview, perhaps it is better not to do it at all. 
3.4 Defending metaphysics against feminist objections 
These are four lines of argument that one can find in feminist and so-
cial construction literature which implicitly problematize metaphys-
ics. Obviously, there is some overlap between them in practice, and 
there may be others. However, I will briefly respond to the objections 
as I laid them out above. 
a. Response to the relevance objection. 
I would not argue that every feminist philosopher should theorize 
about what is prior to social construction, nor would I argue that do-
ing so would advance their particular goals. I’m more interested in 
whether those feminists who are curious about asocial reality, or al-
ternative realities, have a reason to refrain from pursuing that curi-
osity. The fact that asocial metaphysics is not relevant to every re-
search project does not provide such a reason. But note that there 
is a tension between the idea that metaphysics is incapable of hav-
ing consequences of any significance and the “hidden agenda” objec-
tion, according to which traditional metaphysics advances a certain 
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worldview that has problematic consequences. If traditional meta-
physics has served the interests of the status quo, there’s no reason 
to think that feminist metaphysics is irrelevant or incapable of serv-
ing different interests. 
As I argued in Section 2.3, there might be positive reasons, from 
a feminist perspective, to be interested in theorizing about what ex-
ists independently of our current socially constructed reality. As we 
saw with Fausto-Sterling’s account of the sexes, Nelson’s reflections 
on the state of nature, and MacKinnon’s story about difference and 
dominance, there can be power in positing an alternative account, or 
a counter-narrative. If we merely negate our old beliefs about the dis-
tant past or the natural world, we are left with a vacuum where satis-
fying explanations had been. I think that it would strengthen the so-
cial constructivist account to posit a plausible characterization of the 
world without the socially constructed entities in question, as well as 
an alternative account of their origin. 
b. Response to the circularity objection 
According to the circularity objection, theorizing about asocial re-
ality is pointless because the necessary use of socially constructed 
concepts makes it impossible to acquire any information about how 
reality is, or how the past was, in itself, mind-independently. But I dis-
agree. It seems that the objection places the standards for legitimate 
inquiry impossibly high. It effectively rests on the following sort of 
assumptions: 
A. Unless a line of inquiry will result in answers that are definitive 
and certain, then it should not be pursued. Since we can never be 
sure that we are accurately describing objective reality, we should 
refrain from attempting to do so. 
B. To the extent that something is seen from a perspective, it is not 
seen for what it is, as it is in itself. And, if you are not seeing a 
thing as it is in itself, then you have no information about it. 
C. To the extent that you describe something according to the con-
cepts that you possess, you are not describing it as it is itself. And 
if you cannot describe something as it is in itself, your descrip-
tion is illegitimate. 
J .  M c K i t r i c k  i n  B l o o m s b u ry  C o m pa n i o n  t o  A c a d e m i c  F e m i n i s m  ( 2 0 1 8 )      17
I think that these assumptions can be challenged on a number 
of grounds. There can be benefits to having answers that are par-
tial, plausible, or worthy contenders as compared to other avail-
able answers. It can be worthwhile to try to view something even 
if you can’t see all sides at once. Descriptions of things can be bet-
ter or worse, even if they are all incomplete and not fully accurate. 
As Sally Haslanger puts it in “Feminism in Metaphysics: Negotiating 
the Natural”: 
There is a temptation to think that if we cannot “get outside” 
of ourselves to test our beliefs against reality, then there’s 
nothing further we can do epistemically to regulate belief; 
were left with only political negotiation. But there are other 
epistemic considerations that can be brought to bear on belief, 
and provide grounds for claims to truth, for example coher-
ence, evidential support, fruitfulness, and so on. (2012: 155)  
The Foucauldian account of the circularity of our reasoning is un-
duly pessimistic about the prospects of human inquiry. While people 
do have a problematic tendency toward confirmation bias, we are nev-
ertheless capable of recognizing evidence that defies our conceptual 
schemes, as well as revising those schemes accordingly. 
c. Response to the false dichotomy objection 
According to the third objection, theorizing about asocial reality re-
lies on an untenable natural/social distinction. To respond, I need to 
make an awkward distinction-between being able to make a distinc-
tion and being able to apply a distinction. We might not be able to 
apply the natural/social distinction in certain cases, for example, to 
determine which aspects of a man are natural and which are social. 
Maybe they are too intertwined, or maybe all of his features are both 
natural and social. But showing that something is both natural and 
social does not refute the idea that there is a difference between be-
ing natural and being social. We are able to understand the distinc-
tion and apply it in at least some cases. 
Analogously, consider the alcohol/water distinction. If you have 
a mixture of alcohol and water in a glass, you might not be able to 
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distinguish the water from the alcohol. They might mix in a way it 
is practically impossible to say which part is alcohol and which part 
is water. But that does not go to show that there is no difference be-
tween being water and being alcohol. So, perhaps even if we cannot 
tell, which, if any, aspects of a man are natural, we can still make the 
natural! social distinction. 
One might ask: if we can’t apply the distinction, how can we inves-
tigate it? Here, I think it matters whether the investigation is about 
the present or the past. If I am asking which aspects of a currently 
living human being are natural and which are social, then the objec-
tion has some force. But if I am asking about the distant past that pre-
ceded society, no aspect of it is even partially social. 
One possible reply on behalf of those who deny the natural/social 
distinction is that the bounds of the social and the natural are still 
unclear in the distant past. Would small groups of prehistoric hu-
mans count as social? What about a parent and their offspring? What 
about similar groups of nonhuman ancestors? What about other non-
human animals commonly described as “social animals”? Where do 
you draw the line? 
What this reply suggests, quite plausibly, is that humanity is on a 
continuum with the rest of the natural world. Perhaps humans evolved 
as social beings, and no pre-social humans ever existed. And perhaps 
we have been mistaken in thinking of natural and social as opposites. 
In this light, it is plausible that some ways of being social are in fact 
natural. If so, showing that something is social does not show that it 
is not natural. But fortunately, if “natural” does not mean “nonsocial,” 
investigating asocial reality does not, in fact, need to rely on the nat-
ural/social distinction after all. Granted, we are still left with the fact 
that there is no clear point at which the world went from being non-
social to being social. But this does not necessarily preclude investi-
gating the asocial. Again, one can ask more targeted questions such 
as “what were things like before the social construction of gender?” 
or any concept or entity of particular interest. Also, we could theo-
rize about the time well before the fuzzy boundary that is the dawn 
of society. 
I think that one who opposes theorizing about asocial reality would 
make the following retort: even if! grant you that there was noth-
ing social in the pre-social past, your conception of the past and your 
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description of it will necessarily be shaped by your concepts and your 
language, which are shaped by social factors. Your conception and de-
scription of the past will be entirely infused with social influences, 
and so you won’t be able to apply the natural/social distinction to it. 
However, if this is the crux of the objection, it is in fact another artic-
ulation of the circularity objection discussed earlier. 
d. Response to the hidden agenda objection 
It was argued that doing metaphysics can conceal hidden agendas and 
be politically problematic. But typically, the fact that some philoso-
phers have given politically problematic answers to certain metaphys-
ical questions is not taken to be a reason to be disinterested in those 
questions. For example, suppose that you think that certain organized 
religions have been politically problematic and have used the threat 
of eternal damnation as a means of social control. Much ink has been 
spilled defending the metaphysical views in service of those institu-
tions — the separability of the mind and the body, the existence of an 
uncaused cause or a being that exists necessarily, the possibility of 
ultimate moral responsibility. But secular philosophers do not take 
this to be a reason not to discuss the mind–body problem, modality, 
or free will. Likewise, if metaphysical views have served patriarchy, 
that is not a decisive reason to refrain from proposing alternatives. 
Furthermore, there is no necessary connection between what is 
natural or nonsocial and what is inevitable, permanent, or good. If 
staph infections were naturally occurring and plagued organisms since 
before social construction, it wouldn’t follow that antibiotics are not 
possible or should not be used. If the universe predates society, some-
thing came before social construction, even if we know not what. If 
the past or the natural world somehow determines and constrains our 
possibilities, not knowing about the asocial won’t change that fact. If 
we want to resist the idea that the status quo is permanent and mor-
ally unproblematic, it’s hard to see how not thinking about asocial re-
ality would help. If we reject the connection between natural, neces-
sary, and good, we should not worry that an account of the past, the 
natural world, or fundamental reality will worsen our ability to chal-
lenge the status quo. 
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4 A different conception of metaphysics 
While I defended metaphysics against feminist objections in the pre-
vious section, there’s more that needs to be said in defense of specifi-
cally feminist metaphysics. Ironically, the feminist challenges and the 
metaphysical challenges to feminist metaphysics share some common 
assumptions about the aims of metaphysics. They both assume that 
the aim of metaphysics is to provide an aperspectival description of 
mind-independent, fundamental reality. As we saw in Section 2, the 
metaphysical critic thinks that feminist theorists do not share that 
aim, and consequently they fail to be proper metaphysicians. Mean-
while, Section 3 showed that the feminist critic thinks that all meta-
physicians fail to achieve the aim of providing an aperspectival de-
scription of mind-independent fundamental reality, and their illusions 
or pretenses to the contrary are problematic. In sum, the metaphysi-
cal critic holds that metaphysics has certain goals that feminist theory 
lacks, and that these goals are worthwhile, while the feminist critic 
holds that metaphysics has certain goals that feminist theory lacks, 
and that these goals are not worthwhile. Despite their different value 
judgments, the metaphysical critic and the feminist critic are in broad 
agreement. If these critics are correct, feminists and metaphysicians 
should agree to disagree about the merits of metaphysical inquiry and 
go their separate ways, annulling the proffered coupling of feminism 
and metaphysics that would be feminist metaphysics. 
Given these challenges, a defender of feminist metaphysics must of-
fer a different conception of metaphysics. This conception need not be 
antithetical to philosophical traditions, nor outside of the mainstream. 
A conception of metaphysics that has had adherents throughout the 
history of philosophy is the idea that metaphysics is about what kinds 
of things exist, their natures, and how they are related. If, as Barnes 
argues, metaphysics goes beyond the fundamental,  then it extends 
to theories of ordinary objects, people, and complex social entities. 
Furthermore, if composite and complex entities are real, metaphysi-
cal theorizing about such entities can be realist. Feminist metaphysi-
cians can aspire to provide accurate characterizations of things that 
exist. (Granted, some feminist philosophers do not describe them-
selves as realists, so I am not speaking for, defending, or criticizing 
their views here.) 
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While I do not think realist aspirations are futile, I think that a 
heavy dose of epistemic modesty is called for. These considerations 
might be familiar from discussions in feminist epistemology and fem-
inist philosophy of science (Longino 1990; Alcoff and Potter 2013), 
but they bear repeating as applied to feminist metaphysics. The way 
that you characterize things that exist is liable to be colored by your 
perspective. Furthermore, no one has a view from nowhere, and so 
absence of perspective is not possible. You can attempt to transcend 
your particular perspective, but doing so is difficult. Furthermore, 
there are various social factors that exacerbate this difficulty. If you do 
not hear other people’s ideas, you are liable to assume that your per-
spective is universal or not a perspective at all. If you surround your-
self exclusively with like-minded people, your false confidence is re-
inforced and your awareness of your own perspective is diminished. 
Consequently, while absence of perspective is not possible, a plural-
ity of perspectives is possible and advantageous. 
Traditional metaphysicians cannot be faulted for having approached 
metaphysical questions from the social perspective that they happened 
to have. However, to the extent that their philosophical conversations 
excluded women and people from different cultures, their investiga-
tions were impoverished. They did not take sufficient steps to test 
their assumption that their perspective was representative and uni-
versal. Feminist critiques of traditional metaphysics provide such a 
step. For truth-seekers, they should be welcomed as a test of the objec-
tivity of their methods and theories. For mainstream metaphysicians, 
feminist theories of metaphysical subjects can facilitate an awareness 
of their own perspective, and that of others. 
Furthermore, metaphysicians need not disavow political commit-
ments in order to fruitfully engage in metaphysical inquiry. In fact, 
proclamation of one’s ideology can be helpful. It’s not as if people with 
unspoken ideologies have no biases. Presumably, some metaphysi-
cians argue for entelechies, haecceities, or nonphysical substances be-
cause of their personal faith. But metaphysicians aren’t typically cra-
ven opportunists either. Realists want to believe that their reasoning 
is bringing them closer to truth. But somehow, it’s easier to believe 
things that favor your interests or fit with your preconceived notions. 
In this light, it is difficult to see why awareness of ideological or polit-
ical commitments would be a hindrance to realist aspirations. 
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One methodological tool that can be useful for feminist metaphysics 
is model-building (Paul 2012: 9). When you build a model, you might 
begin with fundamental building blocks, but you don’t end there. You 
also arrange them and identify relationships and composite struc-
tures. Rival metaphysical models can be compared relative to various 
criteria such as internal coherence, consistency with well-supported 
phenomena, and explanatory power. It can also be argued or disputed 
whether the model has any normative or political implications. 
Here’s a brief sketch of how comparing metaphysical models could 
be a fruitful project in feminist metaphysics. As noted above, Judith 
Butler criticizes traditional metaphysics for the way it insidiously in-
stalls itself into political discourse (2006: 23). More specifically, she 
focuses on a particular paradigm in metaphysics: hylomorphism — 
the view that substance and form are the two fundamental ontolog-
ical categories. She claims that this view is an artifact of language, 
particularly the subject-predicate grammatical structure which dom-
inates most languages (2011b: 28). She also argues that identifica-
tion of discrete substances is arbitrary, and that the idea of discrete 
substances existing mind-independently is undermined by consider-
ations of vagueness (2011a: xi; see also 2011b: 182). She goes on to 
suggest that the substance-attribute paradigm supports the idea that 
the universe is populated with subjects that have essential natures, 
and their defining activities flow from these natures. Selves with in-
nate gender identities and sexual orientations are at home in this uni-
verse. In short, she claims that heteronormativity is supported by du-
bious metaphysical assumptions. 
While Butler professes to eschew metaphysics altogether, you can 
also interpret her as inviting us to contemplate a metaphysical model 
that is an alternative to hylomorphism. On this alternative model, ac-
tivities are more fundamental than actors (2006: 34). Selves and iden-
tities are constructed from patterns of activity that are shaped by so-
cial forces. One could try to construct a metaphysical model consistent 
with these ideas-perhaps akin to process ontology (Whitehead 1929). 
This model could then be compared to hylomorphic models, and eval-
uated according to various criteria for theory choice, as well as the ex-
tent to which either model can be used to support or undermine social 
structures that may privilege or disadvantage certain social groups.  
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5 Conclusion 
So, yes, the marriage of feminism and metaphysics can be saved. 
One can simultaneously be doing feminist theory and metaphysics. 
However, doing so means rejecting the restriction of metaphysics to 
the contemplation of fundamental, mind-independent reality. It also 
means rejecting the idea that having a perspective or an agenda is 
disqualifying. However, doing feminist metaphysics does not require 
abandoning objectivity, nor the aspiration to provide true descriptions 
of both asocial realities and socially constructed realities. 
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